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I.

INTRODUCTION

This survey focuses on juvenile delinquency and child welfare cases
and to a lesser extent on adoption matters as they relate to child welfare
cases. It discusses several Supreme Court of Florida cases in these topic
areas which have clarified important issues as well as a high court opinion on
the subject of juvenile curfews. The courts of appeal were active in interpreting a variety of statutory issues and, as they have done for years, held the
trial courts strictly accountable for compliance with statutory obligations in
both child welfare and dependency cases.
II.

A.

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Adjudicatory Issues

In 2003, in a very widely followed case, Tate v. State,1 which was the
subject of a special issue of the Nova Law Review,2 the Fourth District Court
of Appeal established the procedural approach to be used in evaluating the
competency of young defendants in the juvenile and adult criminal courts. 3

* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. This article covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2004
through June 30, 2006. The author thanks Ashley Jewell Dillman for her assistance in the
preparation of this article.
1. 864 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
2. Michael J. Dale, Making Sense of the Lionel Tate Case, 28 NOVA L. REV. 467 (2004).
3. Tate, 864So.2dat5l.
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Since that time, a number of courts have ruled on a variety of procedural
issues related to juvenile competency. 4
Section 985.223 of the FloridaStatutes contains a number of provisions
regarding how courts should handle competency in delinquency proceedings.5 One of the major focuses of the law is the distinction between a child
who is incompetent because of mental illness or retardation and a child who
is incompetent because of age or immaturity or any reason other than mental
illness or retardation. 6 In Department of Children & Families v. C.C. (C.C.
I),7 the issue was whether the trial court could commit a child to the Department of Children and Families (DCF) in the absence of evidence showing mental illness or retardation.8 Ruling strictly as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the court read the law to provide that a child who is determined to be mentally ill or retarded and who is adjudicated incompetent to
proceed must be committed to DCF for treatment or training, whereas a child
who is adjudicated incompetent because of age or immaturity may not be
committed to either DCF or the Department of Juvenile Justice. 9 Because
the child's lack of competence derived from age and lack of maturity, the
appellate court quashed the order placing the child with DCF.' 0 In W.G. v.
State," the issue was whether a trial court may order competency restorative
services for an incompetent child charged with a misdemeanor by placement
of the child in a private facility.' 2 The appellate court said that the trial court
lacked the authority to do so under the law because the statute stated that trial
courts may not order any restorative services for an incompetent juvenile
who was charged with what would be a misdemeanor. 3 The court recognized that there might be some difficulty in understanding the logic underlying the statutory scheme but that the law was clear on its face. 14 Chapter 985
also provides that where it appears that a child may never become competent,
the court may dismiss the proceeding."5

In State v. J.L.M, III,16 an eight-

4. See, e.g., Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of FloridaJuvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REv.
397, 399 (2005) [hereinafter Dale, 2004 Survey].
5. See generally FLA. STAT. § 985.223 (2006).
6. Id. § 985.19(2).
7. 889 So. 2d 965 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
8. Id. at 966.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 910 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
12. Id. at 331.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 332.
15. FLA. STAT. § 985.19(5)(c) (2006).
16. 926 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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year-old was declared incompetent. 17 The evidence suggested that the child
would not become competent in the next two years.' 8 The appeals court reversed the trial court dismissal because the evidence showed only that it was
unlikely that the eight-year-old "could be trained to [become] [competent]
within the next 4 [to] 6 years."' 9 The trial court did not find that the child
would never become competent to proceed during the statutory period.2"
The appellate courts have also ruled on several issues related to technical compliance with the involuntary commitment statute. First, in MH.v.
State,2 the First District Court of Appeal held that when the trial court
makes an order of involuntary commitment pursuant to chapter 985, it must
make findings pursuant to three separate prongs of the state statute: 1) that
the child is mentally ill or retarded; 2) that because of the mental illness or
retardation the child is "manifestly incapable of surviving" or that "[t]here is
a substantial likelihood that in the near future the child [would] inflict serious
bodily harm on [him or her]self or others;" and 3) that "less restrictive alternatives" for treatment are inappropriate.2 2 Finally, in Department of Children & Families v. WJ.R., 23 the appellate court held that prior to a commitment of a minor to DCF for competency restoration, DCF must be properly
served and given notice and allowed to participate in a meaningful manner in
the dispositional proceeding.2 4
Issues relating to the waiver of the right to assistance of counsel in delinquency proceedings come up regularly throughout the country.25 The
juvenile's right to counsel was established by the Supreme Court opinion in
In re Gault26 in 1967, and cases interpreting the case are also heard by the

Florida appellate courts each year.27 In K.E.N. v. State,2 8 the appellate court
held, inter alia, that it had grave reservations concerning whether the specific
guidelines established by the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure that govern
the substantive right of the juvenile to counsel, can be complied with by a
17.
18.

Id. at 458.
Id.at 459.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 461.
Id.
901 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 200 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 985.19(3) (2006)).

23. 915 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
24. Id. at 246 (citing Dep't of Child. & Fam. v. J.F.C., 901 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2005)).
25. See generally MICHAEL J. DALE, ET AL., Representing Children in Juvenile Justice
Proceedings,in REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 5.03(1 1)(d)(i) (2006).
26. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
27. See Michael J. Dale, 2002 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA L. REV. 1, 2
(2003) [hereinafter Dale, 2002 Survey].
28. 892 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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"group rights advisory," or an announcement of the rights the children possess made by the court to a group of youngsters appearing before it.29 The
inquiry that the court must make includes a thorough analysis of each child's
comprehension of the offer of the right to counsel and each child's capacity
to make an intelligent and understandable choice to waive it.3" In C.K. v.
State,31 "the trial court failed to make [the] thorough inquiry [necessary]...
to obtain [a] waiver in writing," have the mother verify that the decision was
discussed, and find that the waiver "appeared to be knowing and voluntary."3 2 The checklist the court must run through has been rearticulated by
the appellate courts on a number of occasions and yet, inexplicably the trial
33
courts seem to have trouble complying as the court found in C. V. v. State.
In that case, at arraignment the trial court accepted an oral waiver of counsel
and admission to the charges but failed to inform the child of his rights that
would be relinquished.3 4 The court did not warn the child of the danger and
disadvantages of representing himself, nor did the court make any inquiries
about whether the child's decision was voluntary and knowingly made."
Again, the court failed to obtain a written waiver of counsel.36 On a more
technical level, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed in T.H. v. State
(T.H. 1j),37 where the child was not advised of his right to counsel at a hearing, and the error was not caught until six days after the dispositional hearing
where the child refused counsel. 38 The appeals court held that was fundamental error and reversed.39
In J.R.. v. State,4 ° the child appealed from an order committing him to
a residential facility on revocation of probation. 41 Because the waiver of
counsel in the original delinquency proceeding was not knowingly or intelligently made, the appellate court held that the trial court could not commit the
child upon revocation of probation.4 2 Finally, in D.K. v. State, 43 an appeal
was taken in a case involving representation by a certified law student in29. Id. at 1179.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
909 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 604 (internal quotations omitted).
915 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 665.
Id.
Id.
899 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 505.

Id.
898 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 1094.
Id.
881 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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tern. 44 The appeals court held that "because the name of the certified legal
intern representing [the child was] not listed on the waiver form, it cannot be
said that [the child] made a knowing and intelligent waiver of [the] right to
legal representation. 4' 5 Therefore, the court reversed. 6
Issues relating to application of the United States Supreme Court ruling
in Miranda v. Arizona 47 continue to come before the Florida appellate
courts.4 8 The cases deal both with issues of whether the individual is in custody and whether the confession given was voluntary under the totality of
circumstances test set forth by the Supreme Court of Florida in Ramirez v.
State.49 In J.G. v. State,5 ° the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent on a
charge of sexual battery and appealed on grounds that he was in custody and
the waiver of Miranda rights was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. 5 The appellant was thirteen years old and a seventh-grader
enrolled in an exceptional student educational school setting at the time of
the interview.5 2 The youngster "was familiar with the juvenile justice system." 53 In addition to the failure to notify the appellant's parents or custodian that the child was in custody as provided by Florida law,5 4 but which
would not by itself dispose of the waiver issue, there was no evidence upon
which the court could evaluate the voluntariness of the waiver. 15 Nor did the
trial court make any factual findings. 56 The appellate court held that
"[m]erely reading the Miranda rights form to a [thirteen]-year-old . . . or
having [the child] read the rights form, by itself [did] not establish that [the
child] understood and comprehended the rights he was giving up" as a consequence of the waiver. 7 Furthermore, the court found that a family friend,
whose interests lay closer to that of the victim, assisted in obtaining the confession by tricking the child through an explanation that there was a video

44.

Id. at 51.

45. Id. at 52.
46. Id.
47. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 4, at 401.
739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999).
883 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 917-18.
Id. at 924.
Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 985.207 (2003).
JG., 883 So. 2d at 924.
Id.
Id. at 925.
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tape recording of the child "inappropriately touching the victim. ' '5 8 Under all

these circumstances the appeals court reversed."
A juvenile was charged with committing the offense of poisoning food
or water with intent to kill in B.MB. v. State.6 The interrogation of the child
occurred on school grounds by a police officer who had been called to the
school. 6' The appellate court reversed the trial court finding that the child
had knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda warnings and further found
that the child was in custody at the time of the police interview. 62 In so doing, the court noted that whether the law would have been applied differently
had the case been handled by a school resource officer and an assistant principal was not before the court. 63 The police officer turned off the tape recorder and, in testimony at trial, said that he orally administered the Miranda
warnings at that point in time. 64 The appellate court held that there was no
doubt that the child was in custody. 65 Applying the Ramirez test governing
totality of the circumstances and recognizing that "there is no bright line rule
that would render a confession by juvenile involuntarily," the court held that
a number of factors would produce a finding that the waiver was not voluntary. 66 The court found that the tape recording was turned off and thus there
was no first hand evidence. 67 There was nothing in the record to show that
the child clearly understood her rights. 68 In particular, the child's "age, experience and background did not allow her to appreciate the gravity of the
situation" (the student was in middle school) nor was there any "indication
that [the child] understood that serious criminal charges could result" (a felony). 69 Further, the child was not provided with an opportunity to consult
with a parent before being questioned. 7
Part of the test for the obligation to read a respondent Miranda warnings
is that the person be in police custody for interrogation.7' In J.C.M v.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 927.
60.

927 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

61.

Id. at 221.

62.

Id. at 223.

63. Id. at 221. A number of courts have held that if a police officer is acting as a school
resource officer, the New Jersey v. T.L. 0. test will be applied. See discussion of New Jersey v.
T.L.O., infra nn. 110-11; see also In re W.R., 634 S.E.2d 923, 926-27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
64.

B.MB., 927 So. 2d at 222.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 223.
Id.

69.

B.MB., 927 So. 2d at 223.

70. Id.
71.

See J.C.M. v. State, 891 So. 2d 573, 576 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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State,72 a twelve-year-old was adjudicated to have committed an act of vandalism involving the windshield of an automobile.7 3 The trial court denied a
motion to suppress, and after an adjudication and disposition, the child appealed.74 The sole witness in the case was a police officer who was called to
the scene "in response to a report that someone had damaged [the victim's]
car windshield by what appeared to be a BB gun shooting. 7 5 The police
officer interviewed the child and, after two other officers arrested the father
in the child's presence, told the child to wait until the youngster's brother
came to get him.7 6 During that period, the police officer fabricated a story
that the victim had videotaped the event. 77 The child, in response, incriminated himself.78 The appellate court held that the child was in custody when
he made the admissions.79 Applying an objective test of whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have perceived the situation as
such, the appellate court held that the child was detained, albeit for his own
safety, and that the police officer was clearly interrogating the child. 80 The
appellate court therefore reversed. 8'
An interesting jurisdictional issue was before the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in State v. Jones.82 The issue was whether juveniles charged with
traffic offenses, such as "driving without a valid license," should have their
cases heard "in the traffic division of the county court" or "in the juvenile
division of the circuit court ...as delinquency matters., 83 On a petition for a
writ of prohibition after several cases had been dismissed and then transferred to the juvenile division of the circuit court, the appeals court held that
the Florida statute specifically exempts traffic offenses from circuit court
jurisdiction, and therefore, "the county court has original jurisdiction over
84 They are not statuto. . . [juveniles]."
offenses allegedly committed by the
85
delinquency.
of
acts
rily viewed as

72.

Id.at 573.

73. Id. at 575.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. J.C.M, 891 So. 2d at 577.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79.

Id.

80. Id.
81. J.C.M, 891 So. 2d at 578.
82.

899 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).

83. See id.
at 1280.
84. Id.at 1281.
85. Id.(citing FLA. STAT. § 26.012 (2003)).
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The parents of a victim appealed from a trial court order denying a motion to set aside a pretrial intervention agreement in a delinquency case.8 6 In
S.K. v. State,87 the respondent had been charged with "lewd and lascivious
molestation" of a minor child. 8 The amended petition "later filed chang[ed]
the offense to a misdemeanor battery."89 The court entered a negotiated
agreement known as a "PAY agreement," 9 which "is an acronym used to
refer to [a] prosecution alternative[] . . . youth agreement[]." 9' The victim's
parents, who disagreed with the disposition, sought to challenge the agreement on several grounds. 92 The appellate court held that "the decision to
prosecute lies solely with the State [and] not with the victim of a crime," the
juvenile rules of procedure do not provide "for the victim or the victim's
parents to be involved in the submission of [the] treatment plan or in the decision to" hold or waive the hearing, and the victim's parents are not parties
who will be "allowed to refuse consent to a waiver of a hearing. 93
In delinquency cases involving child victims, issues of hearsay testimony by minors often come before the court. 94 Such was the case in G.H. v.
State.95 In a sexual abuse case, the child victim's mother testified that "the
child told her . . . that someone with [the a]ppellant's first name [had]
touched her, and the child was afraid to reveal [the] information because [of
threats]. 96 The trial court, when asked to rule on the child's hearsay statements, allowed the testimony finding "specifically that the statements [were]
reliable and trustworthy." 97 The appellate court held that the trial court was
in error, because in all cases the court must make specific findings of fact on
the record regarding the reliability of the statements. 98 However, on the facts
of the case, because there was direct testimony from the child upon which
the court could rely for its adjudication, the error was deemed harmless.99
The question of whether a juvenile has the right, through counsel, to
make a closing argument in a delinquency case was before the appellate
86. S.K. v. State, 881 So. 2d 1209, 1210 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
87. Id. at 1209.
88. Id. at 1210.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. S.K., 881 So. 2d at 1210 n.1.
92. Id. at 1210-11.
93. Id. at 1212.
94. The same is true in child welfare cases. See generally MICHAEL J.
Child Witness, in REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 7 (2006).
95. 896 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
96. Id. at 834.
97. Id. at 835.
98.

Id.

99.

Id.

DALE, ET AL.,

The
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court in J.MS. v. State.'0° The child had been charged "with disorderly conduct . . . and disruption of an educational institution."' 0 ' When the State
rested, the child's "defense [counsel] moved for a dismissal arguing that yelling [and] cursing [was] not enough to prove disorderly conduct" and that
"there was no inticement or encouragement.' ' 0 2 "The court denied the motion[] and found [the child] guilty of both counts," whereupon the "defense.
• . asked for a closing argument."' 3 "[T]he court denied the request, citing
the lateness of the hour and another pending case ...

[but] allowed [the] de-

fense counsel to submit a memorandum" and also, at the dispositional hearing, some six weeks later, the right to make a renewed motion for judgment
of acquittal and a closing argument."04 Citing earlier case law, the appellate
court held that "it is an absolute violation of the Sixth Amendment for [a]
court to deny ... defendant[s] the right to make [a] closing argument."'0 5
The appeals court held that the defense was denied the ability to "mak[e] an[]
argument prior to the court's finding of guilt."'0 6 "[M]ak[ing] a written closing argument and [an oral] argument at the disposition hearing after the"
determination of guilt had already been made "[did] not cure the prejudice.' 0 7 The court reversed for a new adjudicatory hearing.'08
Issues involving searches in schools come up regularly in Florida delinquency cases in the Florida courts as they do elsewhere.' 0 9 Pursuant to the
Supreme Court opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.," 1 the test for search and
seizure in schools is reasonable suspicion."' The courts have also held that
suspicion-less administrative searches of students are proper under certain
circumstances. 112 In C.N.H. v. State,113 a child "entered a plea of no contest"
100.

921 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See also S.S. v. State, 204

S.W.3d 512, 513 (Ark. 2005).

101. Id.
102. Id. at 815.
103. Id.
104.

Id.

105. IMS.,921 So. 2d at 816 (quoting M.E.F. v. State, 595 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE, ET AL., Representing Students in School Related Matters, in
REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 6 (2006); Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 4, at 399-401;
Dale, 2002 Survey, supra note 27, at 6-7.
110. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).

Ill. Id. at 342.
112. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648, 664-65 (1995) (applying
random drug analysis testing policy to a student athlete).
113. 927 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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in a delinquency case having been charged with "possession of a weapon on
school property.""' 4 The school in question was "an alternative middle
school," which "ha[d] a policy of [carrying out] daily suspicionless pat-down
searches of every student every morning before [the students were] permitted
to go to ... class[].""' 5 The appeals court held that in the context of"an administrative search, the warrant and probable cause showing is replaced by
[a] requirement ... [of] a neutral plan for execution; a compelling governmental need; the absence of less restrictive alternatives; and reduced privacy
rights.""' 6 Under the facts of the case, the appeals court held that the administrative searches were proper." 7
Florida courts have held that a school resource officer-a police officer
assigned to a school-when conducting a search in a school, need only have
reasonable suspicion to search." 8 The court so held in State v. J.H. 9 In
J.H., "[a] police officer.., at the school was told by another student [who
had been] found with marijuana, that [the respondent] had possessed marijuana earlier [in the] day. The officer contacted the dean . . . [who] asked
[the juvenile] to step out of class, and [when] the officer asked if [the youngster] had anything improper on him," the child offered up the marijuana.'2 0
"[A]cknowledg[ing] that the standard is a reasonable suspicion," the child
argued, nonetheless, that because he was in custody, Miranda warnings
should have been given. 122 The appeals court held that while it may be correct that in a "custodial interrogation by the officer" Mirandawarnings were
required, that issue was not dispositive "because the drugs would have been
' 23 It therefore reversed
discovered inevitably without [the] interrogation."'
24
1
suppression.
the
the trial court order upholding

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
685 So.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at2.
Id.
Id at4.
Id. at4-5.
State v. J.H., 898 So. 2d 240, 241 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. D.S.,
2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
J.H., 898 So. 2d at 241.
Id.
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DispositionalIssues

The Supreme Court of Florida has decided two significant cases involving dispositional issues during the most recent survey period. In J.I.S. v.
State,"25 the question was whether a juvenile who received "an indeterminate
residential commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) [is] entitled to credit for time served in secure detention before the commitment?"' 2 6
The Court held that in the case of "'indeterminate' commitment, which is a
residential commitment [where the DJJ has] authority over the [defendant]
until ... [the youngster] reaches a statutorily prescribed age,... credit for
time served in secure detention [pre-commitment] is not required by any
court rule, statute, or constitutional provision."' 2 7 Therefore, the child is not
entitled to credit for time served."'2 However, the Court stated that "credit is
required [in] a 'determinate' commitment" setting."' 29 That is, "for an offense such as a misdemeanor that ... necessarily conclude[s] before the juvenile reaches the age at which [the authority of DJJ ends]," credit for time
served does apply. 30
' The distinction between determinate and indeterminate
sentences is as follows: "[C]ommitments circumscribed by the maximum
adult punishment [are] 'determinate' and those limited only by the offender
[obtaining] a certain age [are] 'indeterminate."" 3 ' As the Court noted, because "[t]he juvenile justice system [focuses on] rehabilitat[ing] youth,"
youngsters "are committed for indeterminate lengths of time"'32 as a general
proposition in the absence of a statute that states otherwise. 133 Thus, it is
"generally impossible to [set] a date from which to deduct time spent in se' 34
cure detention." 1
The second Supreme Court of Florida case involving dispositions in delinquency cases is N.C. v. Anderson. 1"' The issue before the Court was
125. 930 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2006).
126. Id. at 589.
127. Id. at 590.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. J.LS., 930 So. 2d at 590. For a discussion of the Supreme Court of Florida's view of
.entitlement to jail credit on an adult sentence, see Moore v. State, 882 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 2004).
131. J.1S., 930 So. 2d at 592.
132. Id. at 593 (quoting C.C. v. State (CC. 1), 841 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003)).
133. See id at 595.
134. Id. at 593 (quoting C.C. 1, 841 So. 2d at 658).
135. 882 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2004); see also D.G. v. State, 896 So. 2d 920, 921-22 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (applying the N.C. holding to situations "where special conditions of
probation [need] not [be] orally pronounced at [a] disposition hearing").
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whether, in addition to being "entitled to a written order of disposition containing all the terms of disposition," a juvenile is entitled "to an oral pronouncement containing all of [those] terms?"' 136 The Court held that as a
matter of due process, there is no requirement "that the trial court issue an
oral pronouncement of disposition," and that the relevant rule of juvenile
procedure contains "adequate safeguard[s] for minors who wish to challenge
their written dispositions."' 37 The majority based its due process analysis on
the flexibility in juvenile cases as distinguished from adult criminal cases.' 38
The flexibility allows the State to act in its parens patriae role differently,
and therefore, a balance is struck with respect to "informality" and "flexibility.' 139 What is odd about this rationale is that flexibility is used by the
Court as the predicate for providing less information to juveniles, 140 who it
would seem, need more information.
Chief Justice Pariente concurred because of her desire to discuss a separate issue not before the Court, "but which nevertheless deserve[d] attention." 4' The issue was "the lack of adequate gender-specific programs and
services for... delinquent girls"'' 42 "with a history of sexual abuse and depression, [who] acted out and committed a misdemeanor domestic battery."' 143 The juvenile before the court in N.C., who did not receive the services she needed "in a lower level program or. . . intensive home services,"
and thus, was placed in a higher level program, demonstrated the need of the
governmental branches to "cooperate to ensure that [the] juvenile justice
system can fulfill its mandate of providing rehabilitation [services] to children ...most at risk and most [at] need."'"
The issue of whether a fine can be part of a disposition, among other issues, was before the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently in A.MP. v.
State. 145 At disposition, the court held that "the fact that she went to trial
cost the taxpayers in this community a greater amount. And [the court
would] like to have fines [that] have some relationship to the impact on the
community."' 146 The appellate court held "that the trial court [had] no power
to impose a fine on a juvenile in... delinquency proceeding[s] because [the]
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

NC., 882 So. 2d at 991.
Id. at 993 (citing FLA. R. JUv. P. 8.135).
Id.at 994.
Id.(citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984)).
Id.
N.C., 882 So. 2d at 996 (Pariente, C.J., concurring).
Id.
Id.at 997.
Id.
927 So. 2d 97, 98 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
Id.at 99.
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imposition of a fine is not included within the
powers of disposition given to
47
the trial court in a delinquency proceeding."1
In a second case involving the powers of the delinquency court, B.R. v.
State,14 among the issues was the question of whether or not the trial court
could, at disposition, refuse to allow the juvenile's parent to speak. 149 The
appellate court reversed on the basis of a state statute which required the
Florida court to give all parties the right to comment before determining and
announcing its disposition. 50 To make matters worse, as the appellate court
explained, in addition to preventing the respondent's mother from speaking
at the dispositional hearing, the trial court made statements which discouraged the child's right not to plead guilty in contravention of prior Florida
case law. 1' The appellate court reversed, ordering that a new dispositional
hearing be held before a different judge. 52
'
An issue that comes up with some regularity is the question of the juvenile court's ability to order the DCF to provide certain services to children
before the delinquency court. One such issue is treatment for a juvenile detained under the Jimmy Ryce Act.'53 Several courts have now held that the
trial court exceeded its authority in ordering DCF to provide a specific treatment for such children including, most recently, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Departmentof Children & Familiesv. C.B.154
In R.D. W. v. State,'-" a case involving an unusual factual scenario, a ju-

venile charged with possession of cannabis, who later entered a plea of no
contest to the charge-and where the court withheld adjudication placing the
youngster on probation-appealed from the dispositional order to the extent
that it required him to remove a tattoo from his neck as a special condition of
the probation.'5 6 The appellate court reversed, finding no legal basis upon

147.
148.

Id. at 100.
902 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).

149. Id. at 334.
150. Id. at 335 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.23(l)(d) (2004)). The opinion was also based on
prior Florida case law which "held that a trial court's failure to allow a child's parents to testify at a disposition hearing constitutes reversible error." Id.(citing K.R. v. State, 584 So. 2d
1132 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991) and T.H. v. State (T.H. 1), 573 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1991)).
151. Id. (citing A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994, 995-96 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
152. B.R., 902 So. 2d at 336.
153. See FLA.STAT. §§ 394.910-.932 (2006).

154.

884 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also Dep't of Child. & Fams. v.

Harter, 861 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. I.C.,
742 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
155. 927 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

156. Id. at 195-96.
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which the court could enter the order of tattoo removal.' 57 The test for special conditions of probation is found in the Supreme Court of Florida opinion
Biller v. State. 158 There was no evidence in the record in R.D. W. that the
tattoo had anything to do with the condition of probation found in Biller,
such as the "relationship to the crime which the defendant was convicted,...
conduct that is in itself criminal, or ... conduct which is reasonably related
to the defendant's future criminality."' 159 The State argued that state law provides that a minor may not be tattooed without written, notarized consent of
the parent or guardian, and therefore it would violate the law for the juvenile
to have a tattoo placed on his or her body unless parental permission is ob' The court rejected this argument, finding that it is "the person who
tained. 60
tattooed the minor who breaks the law.'' 6. Judge Palmer dissented in the
appellate court on the ground that having the tattoo was unlawful. 6' 2
Restitution-related issues come up repeatedly before Florida's intermediate appellate courts. 163 In C.T.H. v. State,'64 a juvenile had been charged
with trespass to a structure and resisting arrest. 16' The child pleaded no contest.166 At a restitution hearing, the complaining witnesses testified that the
juvenile had trespassed on his property several times, sprayed a fire extinguisher, ransacked the house and that property was taken. 167 The trial court
ordered $1,279 in restitution. 168 Because the loss must be connected causally
to the offense charged and cannot be ordered for an unconnected offense, and
where, in the case at bar, it was unclear what damage related to the trespass
charges, the court on appeal reversed and remanded for a new restitution
hearing. 169 The same issue was before the court in S.M v. State.17' The
child pleaded no contest to trespass in a conveyance (a vehicle).17' At the
restitution hearing, the owner of the automobile testified to $2647.71 in dam157. Id. at 195.
158. 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
159. R.D.W, 927 So. 2d at 196 (citing Biller, 618 So. 2d at 734-35).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 197 (Palmer, J., dissenting).
163. See Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 4, at 404-05.
164. 905 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
165. Id. at 1031.
166. Id. at 1032.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. C.T.H., 905 So. 2d at 1032-33; see also Glaubius v. State, 688 So. 2d 913 (Fla.
1997); Johnston v. State, 870 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Faulkner v. State, 582
So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
170. 881 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
171. Id. at 79.
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1 The appellate court reversed and remanded because there was no
age. 72
173 It, too,
evidence showing the juvenile was responsible for the damage.
74
1
hearing.
was reversed and remanded for a new restitution

III. DEPENDENCY
One of the commonly litigated grounds for dependency in Florida is
whether a child is at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or
neglect by a parent, legal custodian, or sibling.' 75 In M W. v. Department of
Children and Family Services (M W II),' 76 a father appealed from a dependency finding as to three natural children based upon his sexual abuse of a
step-sibling. 177Despite the fact that a psychologist testified that the chances
of the subject children being abused was "below base rates but ... not zero
by any means,"'' 78 the appellate court affirmed. 17 Because the nature of the
court ruled it was intolerable to allow even a low
harm was so great, the
80
probability of abuse.
Under Florida law, a dependency petition does not have to be filed
82
against both parties. 8' A petition may allege acts by only one parent.
However, parents who are not respondents are nonetheless parties and, as
such, are entitled to be served with pleadings, orders, and papers.8 3 However, because they are not respondents, they have neither a statutory or conaccording to the court in C.L.R. v. Departmentof
stitutional right to counsel
84
Children& Families.1

Under Florida law, gay and lesbian couples may not marry.1 5 Florida
does not recognize same sex marriages validly entered elsewhere.8 6 While

172.

Id.

173. Id.at 80.
174. Id.
175. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14), (34) (2006) (describing Florida's definition of dependency and legal custody); R.F. (In re M.F.) v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla.

2000).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

881 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 737 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 39.501(3)(c) (2006).
Id.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.225(c).
913 So. 2d 764, 767 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2006).
Id.
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Florida law does allow gay and lesbian couples to act as foster parents, I1 7
they may not adopt. 188 In D.E. v. R.D.B.,189 a mother's former gay partner
commenced a dependency proceeding alleging the child born through artificial insemination was abused and/or neglected because the biological mother
cut off visitation with the former partner. 90
' Under Florida law, a non-parent
cannot seek custody or visitation. 91 The appeals court held that a parent's
decision to deny contact with someone who has no rights to custody or visitation with a "child is an inadequate ground upon which to base" dependency
adjudication. 9 '
DCF sometimes seeks to place dependent children in residential mental
health treatment facilities. 19' In 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida decided
M W. v. Davis (M. W. )194 in which it held that an adjudicatory hearing, albeit
one that did not comply with Florida's civil commitment statute (known as
the Baker Act), was required prior to such a placement. 95 The question in In
re J. W 96 was what should be the proper standard of proof in such a proceeding. 197 Making reference to the child's substantial liberty interest "in not
being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment,"9 8the Court in J W. held
that the standard was clear and convincing evidence. 1
Florida law provides that a parent of sufficient means can be ordered to
pay fees established by DCF for the care of a child who has been placed in
shelter care as long as the parent is afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard about the amount of the assessment. 99 In D. W. v. Departmentof Children & Families,200 a case indistinguishable from the opinions and involving
the same judge, the Honorable Daniel Dawson, the appeals court reversed
and remanded for a new hearing on notice to the parents because the support
order had been entered without notice.20 ' The circumstances under which the
187. See Lofton v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 808, 814
(11 th Cir. 2004).
188. FLA. STAT. § 63.042.
189. 929 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
192. Id. at 1165.
193. See M W. v. Davis (M.W. I), 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 109.
196. 890 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
197. Id. at 339.
198. Id. at 340.
199. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(1 1)(a) (2006).
200. 882 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
201. Id. at 493; see R.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 877 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004); L.O. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 876 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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payment orders were made are remarkable. As a matter of administrative
convenience, they were "entered under [a] separate case number in the domestic relations division, not in the dependency" division by Judge Dawson. 212 As the appeals court noted, it is possible for the court to enter a support order other than through Chapter 39.203 But to do so, without notice to
the parent, some seventy years after the seminal United States Supreme
Court ruling in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,2 4 which established the due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard,
where the government is involved in a taking of property, is inexplicable.2 °5
The question of whether non-respondent custodians are entitled to payment of attorneys fees in a dependency proceeding was before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department of Children & Families v. H.G.206 A
child with multiple developmental and emotional problems was in the care of
his uncle and aunt, his mother having died and his father having been incarcerated for most of the child's life. 0 7 When the aunt and uncle could no
longer care for the boy and because he needed residential care, DCF commenced a dependency proceeding in which the custodians were notified but
not named as respondents. 2 8 The custodians hired a lawyer for whom they
later sought payment. 20 9 The appeals court overturned the trial court's award
of attorney's fees. 2" ° It held that the custodians were merely participants in
the proceeding and not parties. t 1 Only parties are statutorily authorized to
seek fees.2" 2
A question involving the application of the constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination of one's accuser in a dependency court was
before the Third District Court of Appeal in A.B. v. Department of Children
& Families Services.213 The mother was charged with neglect for failure "to
protect her [fifteen-year-old daughter] from the stepfather's sexual and
physical abuse. ,21 4 The child testified by deposition.2 5 The appeals court

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

D. W., 882 So. 2d at 493.
Id.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id. at 320.
922 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 1073.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1075.
H.G., 922 So. 2d at 1075.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(49), 57.105 (2006)).
901 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 325.
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rejected the mother's constitutional claim for two reasons.21 6 First, it held
the dependency proceeding is a civil rather than criminal proceeding and,
therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply." 7 Second, "the [respondent's] counsel was given [the] opportunity to crossexamine the child" at the deposition.218
IV. PROSPECTIVE ABUSE AND NEGLECT

Florida courts continue to be faced with vexing issues related to the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Florida's 1991 opinion in Padgett v.
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,2 9 in which the Court held
that a trial court may constitutionally terminate parental rights to a child who
had not yet been abused or neglected based upon past abuse by the parent of
another child.22 °

In K.A. v. Department of Children & Family Services,22 '

the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of parental
rights to a child who had been the subject of egregious abuse, but reversed as
to two older siblings on grounds that there was no competent, substantial
evidence that the parent posed a substantial risk of significant harm to those
children.222 The court found "no nexus or predictive relationship between
the past abuse of the infant. .. and prospective abuse of the older children,"
under a test set forth in a number of earlier intermediate appellate court opinions.223 In so doing, however, the court recognized a conflict among the district courts of appeal involving the proper analytic framework for determining whether or not another child may become a victim of prospective
abuse.224 It commented upon the difference between the Fifth District view
that allows a presumption that past egregious abuse of one child is predictive
of future abuse of another child 225 and the Fourth District position that a pre215. Id.; see FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.245(g)(3)(B)(ii) (providing that someone who is unavailable
because he or she lives more than 100 miles from the place of hearing or is out of state may
give testimonial evidence by deposition).
216. A.B., 901 So. 2d at 326-27.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 327.
219. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
220. Id. at 571.
221. 880 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
222. Id. at 710.
223. Id. at 709 (citing A.D. (In re G.D.) v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 870 So. 2d 235,
238 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
224. Id.
225. Id.; see also Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. B.B., 824 So. 2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2002); A.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 816 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
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sumption is unconstitutional "because it relieves the state of its burden to
demonstrate that the reunification of [a] parent and child poses a substantial
risk of harm to that child. ' 226 The court in K.A. did not reach this question,
because applying either test, it concluded, the State had not met its burden of
showing that the parent posed a substantial risk of significant harm to the two
older children,
and thus far the trial court's position was not found to be er227
roneous.
The issue referred to by the appellate court in K.A. on the question of
proof in a termination of parental rights case involving harm to one child
serving as the basis for a claim involving a second child finally reached the
Supreme Court of Florida in FloridaDepartment of Children & Families v.
F.L. (F.L. 11)228 The Court analyzed the statute, finding it constitutional, but
reversed the Fourth District opinion on the grounds that the State must prove,
in such a case, both prior involuntary termination to a sibling and "a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child., 229 The opinion, over a dissent by Justice Weld with which Justice Cantero concurred, interpreted
Padgett in light of the 1998 amendment to Chapter 39 as remaining unchanged in terms of its requirements. 23" Thus, in addition to being obligated
to prove both a prior involuntary termination of the parental rights for a sibling and a substantial risk of significant harm to the child before the court,
the State must also prove that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive methodology to protect the child from harm. 23' The Court explained
that egregious abuse and neglect of another child tends to indicate a greater
risk of harm to the current child, while the amount of time that has passed
since the prior involuntary termination is also relevant. 32 Evidence of
change of circumstances of the parent since the prior involuntary termination
was also viewed by the court as being significant as past conduct necessarily
has some predictive value regarding the parent's future conduct. 233 Finally,
the court emphasized that the parent was "not required to show ...changed
234
circumstances to avoid a termination of rights under section 39.806(1)(i).,,

226. K.A. (In re KA.), 880 So. 2d at 709 n.1 (citing F.L. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. (F.L.
1), 849 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
227. Id. at 709.
228. 880 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2004).
229. Id.at611.
230. Id. at 609.
231. Id.at 610.
232. Id.
233. F.L. II, 880 So. 2d at 610.
234. Id.
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Incarceration is another ground for termination of parental rights in
Florida.235 Interpretation of the termination statute in the context of the parent serving a prison sentence was before the Supreme Court of Florida in the
fall of 2004.236 The certified conflict issue before the Court was whether the
incarceration provision, requiring a parent to be incarcerated for a substantial
portion of the period of time before the child obtains the age of eighteen,
requires consideration of the entire period of incarceration or only the period
to be served after the termination petition has been filed.237 In B.C. v. Department of Children & Families (B.C. 11),238 the Supreme Court of Florida
held that only the remaining period of incarceration is the appropriate standard. 239 Applying principles of statutory construction, and over a dissent by
Justice Wells, the Court applied a narrow interpretation of the statutory language and a constitutionally-required focus on future harm to the child.24 °
The second case involving egregious conduct as grounds for termination of parental rights was D.A.D. (In re D.A.D. II) v. Department of Children & Family Services.24' In that case, the child's father strangled a man to
death in the family home while the mother and children were visiting relatives in another state.242 There was also evidence that "the [f]ather had shot
his brother-in-law in an unsuccessful murder-for-hire plot," although he was
not charged with this attempt.243 This evidence was presented at the adjudicatory hearing as well as evidence of what was described by the court as the
children's "long [and] harrowing relationship with [their] [f]ather. '' 2' The
children's "[f]ather was an alcoholic and [a] cocaine-abuser with an extensive criminal record who was frequently jailed" and "never contributed
money [to] the household expenses" as well as an individual who exhibited
"jealous and controlling behavior toward the [m]other. ' ' 24 5 The appellate
court held that the "[f]ather's homicidal conduct was deplorable and outrageous." However, there was inadequate evidence to establish a "sufficient
235.

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.806(1)(d) (2006).

236. B.C. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. (B.C. 1), 887 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2004).
237. Id. at 1051.
238. Id. at 1046; see also Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. B.C. (B.C. 1), 884 So. 2d 995
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003); J.W. (Inre A.W.) v. Dep't of Child. & Fan. Servs., 816 So. 2d
1261 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003); J.P.C. (Inre J.D.C.) v. Dep't of Child. & Fain. Servs., 819
So. 2d 264 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
239. B.C. 11, 887 So. 2d at 1055.
240. See id.at 1057.
241. 903 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
242. Id.at 1036.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.at 1038.
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nexus between [that] conduct and the specific harm to the children" in support of an egregious conduct finding. 246 Rather, the appellate court held the
father's conduct which amounted to "an unrelenting pattern of abuse," neglect, and abandonment, did constitute egregious conduct.247 Therefore, the
court affirmed the termination of parental rights.248
As noted previously in a survey article in this law review, the parent's
failure to appear at a hearing in a termination of parental rights case can result in a default and a termination of parental rights.2 49 The issue arose again
in Department of Children & Families v. A.S.25° In an opinion which conflicted with courts in other districts, the Fifth District held that the failure to
appear by a parent does not constitute consent to termination under one provision of the Florida Statutes rendering proceedings involuntary.251 There
are two separate provisions of the FloridaStatutes--one governing involuntary termination and the other governing voluntary termination.2 52 The court
engaged in a process of statutory construction and concluded that the legislature did not intend that consent under the one provision governing an involuntary proceeding be turned into one that is voluntary.25253
4 For these reasons,
it reversed noting its conflict with the Second District.
A second failure to appear case resulting in termination of parental
rights is E.A. v. Department of Children & Families Services.2 55 In this case,
the parent arrived at the termination hearing about twenty-two minutes after
the testimony began, explaining that he had been "ensnarled in a traffic jam
resulting from an automobile accident., 256 He further indicated that he had
called the court and left a message relating to his tardiness.257 The trial court,
nonetheless, determined that the respondent had been defaulted and would
not be permitted to participate in the proceeding.258 Under Florida law, if the
parent fails to appear at the appropriate time and place, both statute and the
rules of juvenile procedure give the court the ability to consider the parent's
246. D.A.D. (In re D.A.D. II), 903 So. 2d at 1037.
247. Id. at 1039.
248. Id. at 1041.
249. See Dale, 2002 Survey, supra note 27, at 22-23.
250. 927 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
251. Id. at 205.
252. See FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2006).
253. A.S. (In re R.S.), 927 So. 2d at 208-09.
254. Id. at 209 (citing In re A.D.C., 854 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002); and In re
T.S., 855 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
255. 894 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th Dist Ct. App. 2005).
256. Id. at 1051.
257. Id.

258. Id.
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absence to constitute consent to the termination of his or her parental
rights.259 However, referring to prior case law, the appellate court in E.A.
held that the purpose
of the rule was "not to terminate parental rights on a
'gotcha' basis." 2" Concluding that implied consent based upon a late arrival
to a hearing should be disfavored, the appellate court reversed.26'
In the event a parent fails to appear and a termination is entered, a motion to vacate a default judgment terminating parental rights is appropriate,
and if the parent has a meritorious defense, the motion should be granted.262
This matter arose in E.S. v. Department of Children & Family Services. 63
Both the mother and her appointed counsel were absent at the final hearing
on termination of her parental rights. 264 The next day the mother moved to
set aside the default on the grounds that she was unable to attend the hearing
because she had medical justifications and that appointed counsel had advised the judge's chambers that he was in another hearing and was therefore
unable to be in attendance at the present trial. 265 Although the appellate court
shared the trial court's skepticism about the sufficiency of the mother's
medical excuse, the court held that the mother had acted with due diligence
in filing the motion and given the fact that the mother had attended all of the
previous hearings in the case, she should have been permitted to testify in
opposition to the argument that her medical excuse was insufficient and she
had no meritorious defense.2 66 For these reasons the appellate court reversed. 267
In In re TB. v. Department of Children & Family Services,268 the trial
court granted termination of parental rights and denied a parent's request for
a continuance resulting in a failure to appear at the adjudicatory hearing. 69
The appellate court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in not
granting the father's request for a continuance. 270 The father had driven nine
hours to this hearing, but could not attend on the next day, which was when
259. Id.(citing B.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 882 So. 2d 1099, 1100 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2004)).
260. E.A., 894 So. 2d at 1051.

261.
262.
2004).
263.
264.

Id.at 1051-52.
E.S. v. Dep't of Child. & Fain. Servs., 878 So. 2d 493, 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
Id.at 493.
Id.at 494.

265. Id.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.at 496.
E.S., 878 So. 2d at 497.
920 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
Id.at 171.
Id.at 174.
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the case was rescheduled. 271 The court "ordered the father to appear the next
day before [a different judge], and the father [had] responded that he could
not., 27 2 The appellate court reversed on the grounds that the trial court

"placed more emphasis on judicial econom[ic] . . . convenience than on the
father's right to [care for] his child and ... have his day in court, 273 which

constituted reversible error.274
One of the basic grounds for termination of parental rights is abandonment. 75 Another is failure to comply with the case plan.276 Regardless of
the grounds for termination of parental rights, the Department of Children
277
and Family Services must plead the correct grounds and then offer proof.
In T.M v. Department of Children & Families (T.M 11),278 the Department

alleged that a father failed to comply with the case plan and his continued
involvement with the child threatened the child's life and safety. 279 The appellate court found that the Department had not proved either ground, and
thus a court finding of abandonment must be reversed because that was not
one of the grounds pleaded. 8 0
The right to counsel for parents in dependency and termination of parental rights proceedings in Florida is governed by statute. 281' The United
States Supreme Court has never held that there is an absolute right to counsel
for parents even in termination of parental rights cases.282 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court of Florida has held that the state constitutional due process
clause does not create a right to appointed counsel in termination of parental
rights cases.283 The Court has spoken about the effectiveness of counsel in a
dependency context. 284 That topic has been the subject of discussion in surin8a
an incisive student article.286 The
vey articles in this law review 285' and in
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 171.
Id.
T.B., 920 So. 2d at 174.
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275.
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Id. at 171.
§ 39.806(1)(b) (2006).
Id. § 39.806(1)(e).
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277. See T.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. (T.M 11), 905 So. 2d 993, 998 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2005).

278. Id. at 993.
279. Id. at 995.
280. Id.
at 998-99.
281. FLA. STAT.§§ 39.801-.817 (2006).
282. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
283. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 87 (Fla. 1980).
284. See S.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 851 So. 2d 689, 690-92 (Fla. 2003).
285. Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 4, at 423.
286. Michele R. Forte, Making the Casefor Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary
Termination of ParentalRights Proceedings, 28 NOVA L. REv. 193 (2003).
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question left unanswered by the Supreme Court of Florida was whether the
statutory right to counsel for parents in TPR cases would generate a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. That issue was before the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in E.T. v. State.287 In a detailed opinion by Judge May with
a partial dissent by Judge Stevenson, the court held as a technical matter that
the parent, who filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus had used the incorrect methodology and instead should have been taken on appeal.2 8 The
court also certified the question of whether Florida recognizes a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel arising from a lawyer's representation of a
parent in a termination of parental rights case and what procedures should be
followed to pursue such a claim.2 89 Judge Stevenson dissented, writing that
he would hold that Florida's due process clause does guarantee a right to
meaningful and effective assistance of counsel in a TPR proceeding.2 90
V.

ADOPTION

The Supreme Court of Florida has recently spoken on the issue of the
need of consent by the Department of Children and Family Services to adoption proceedings in B. Y v. Department of Children & Families, 291 clearing up
a conflict between the district courts of appeal.2 92 The Court reviewed the
state statutes governing child welfare matters and analyzed the ongoing jurisdiction and obligations of the trial court. 2 93 The Court reviewed the Florida Statutes governing consent to adoption, finding that a court may finalize
an adoption without consent of the Department if such consent is unreasonably withheld.2 94 Thus, given the legislative mandates for the Court's continued jurisdiction to advance children's best interests, the Court has the authority to grant the adoption without the consent of the Department when such
consent is unreasonably withheld.
The First District Court of Appeal recently held that there is a right to
counsel for a parent in a Chapter 63 adoption case predicated upon the adverse parent's right to defend a petition to terminate parental rights pursuant
to that chapter. 295 In G.C. v.
287.

W.J,296

the appellate court reversed the trial

930 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).

288. Id. at 729.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 727 n.2, 729 (thirty-one states have addressed the issue); 1 MICHAEL J. DALE
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court holding that while Chapter 63 does not speak to express appointment of
counsel, the entitlement was
inherent or fundamental where parental rights
29 7
are subject to termination.
The issue of how courts hearing adoption cases and termination of parental rights cases relate to each other was before the appellate court in In re
S.N. W. 298 The specific issue was whether the circuit court was required by
statute to permit an adoption agency to intervene in a dependency proceeding.299 Under the facts of the case, a dependency proceeding was brought
against the birth mother who thereafter, independently, and without notice to
DCF, contacted an adoption agency and adoption proceedings commenced. 300 "Prior to the adjudicatory hearing," the adoption agency filed a
petition to terminate parental rights, but the petition was not filed within the
dependency case. 3"' While the TPR proceeding was pending, the agency
"filed a request to intervene in the dependency action ....
to dismiss [that]
action, and [to] terminate the jurisdiction of the dependency court. 30 2 Although the issue was not strictly one of subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court held that "[t]he court in which the adoption proceeding [was] pending and the court in which the dependency proceeding [was] pending are
both circuit courts with jurisdiction to determine [the] issue[]."3 °3 Neither
statute nor court opinion mandates how the circuit court may administer the
reassignment of cases as long as the cases are within the jurisdiction of the
circuit court. 3' However, Chapter 39 does say that the "orders of [a] dependency court 'shall take precedence over other custody and visitation orders' entered" in any other circuit court. 30 5 The appellate court concluded
that the adoption agency was entitled to intervene in a dependency proceeding pursuant to the adoption law.306

296. Id.at 998.
297. Id. For a more detailed explanation of the right to counsel for parents in termination
of parental rights cases and dependency cases, see discussion supra p. 23. See also Michael J.
Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency Cases in Florida,25 NOVA L. REV. 769,
784 (2001).
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299. Id. at 373.
300. Id.at 370.
301. Id.
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Finally, in J.L v. Department of Children & Family Services, °7 the appellate court was faced with a procedural issue relating to whether DCF termination of parental rights permanency staffing meetings are subject to the
Sunshine Law and whether failure to notify the public, the parents, and the
attorneys of such a meeting violates the statute.3 °8 The court held that the
Sunshine Law does not apply to termination of parental rights meetings that
are carried out by DCF for the purpose of determining whether to file a petition to terminate the parental rights. 30 9 The court applied Florida case law,
statutes, and the administrative code governing the Sunshine Law, concluding that nothing in the law provides that official action be taken at the staff
the
meeting and further that Chapter 39 contains principles standing for
30
confidential.
be
to
is
child
the
involving
information
all
proposition that
VI. CURFEW
The issue of juvenile curfews has been before a variety of courts in a
variety of jurisdictions for a number of years now.31 The courts have generally upheld juvenile curfew ordinances where they are narrowly drawn and
based upon documented evidence of the need for them to reduce crime.3 1
The subject recently reached the Supreme Court of Florida for the second
time.3 13 The issue in State v. jp. 31 4 was first, what level of constitutional
analysis should be applied to two local Florida ordinances, second, whether
the ordinances implicated juveniles' rights to free speech and assembly, and
third, whether the ordinances were narrowly tailored to serve compelling
governmental interests and therefore whether they violated the juveniles'
constitutional right to freedom of movement and privacy. 3 5 First, the Court
reaffirmed that strict scrutiny is applied in Florida.31 6 Recognizing that a
child's constitutional rights are not absolute, the Court held that the cities'
assertion of a compelling interest in preventing victimization of youngsters
can outweigh privacy right for the youngsters during curfew hours if the ordinances are narrowly tailored to achieve that end, and further, that the municipalities may have a compelling interest in protecting the juveniles and
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
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reducing juvenile crime, which would outweigh the juveniles' right to travel
freely during this time period, again, as long as the ordinances are narrowly
tailored.3 17 Oddly, while the data supporting the compelling governmental
interest was challenged by the juveniles, the Court held that statistical data is
not necessary, nor is scientific analysis, to show the wisdom of the legislature's determination."' However, the Court concluded that the ordinances
were not narrowly drawn because they imposed criminal sanctions for second and subsequent violations, and thus, did not meet strict scrutiny as they
were antithetical to the municipalities' stated interest in protecting the juveniles from victimization." 9 Judge Wells and Judge Cantero dissented at
length as to the strict scrutiny standard and other constitutional rights.320
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida has been quite active in dealing with several major issues involving the rights of children including curfews and standards for termination of parental rights, delinquency, and adoption. The intermediate appellate courts have also responded to important issues governing the rights of children. However, in addition, the intermediate appellate
courts have continued their longstanding approach to juvenile justice and
child welfare cases in which they hold the trial courts strictly accountable for
compliance with both constitutional and state statutory obligations. On occasion, the appellate courts have been blunt in their response to errors of the
trial courts that the appellate courts viewed as basic and obvious.
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